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Introduction 
Justice is a term with a wide ‘penumbra of uncertainty.’ Borrowing the words 
of Plato and others, Kirk captured the definition of Justice in just one phrase, 
suum cuique, which means to each his own.1 Despite the recurring contro-
versy over the meaning and normative content of the notion of justice, mod-
ern human rights enterprise posits the idea as articulating at least four obliga-
tions in the context of atrocity crimes, i.e., the duty to prosecute, disclosure of 
the truth, the right of victims to reparation and guarantees of non-repetition. 2 
There is, inter alia, the discourse regarding what objective we can achieve 
through prosecution and how effective it can ensure the contemporary con-
ception of accountability. This article examines the utility of prosecutorial 
justice as a comprehensive tool for combating gross violations of human 
rights and serious breaches of humanitarian law without ignoring other inter-
related imperatives of justice. It seeks to posit the debate between peace and 
justice and tries to make a critical analysis of whether the concern for justice 
truly jeopardizes the effort for peace in the particular context of Darfur.  
The article further looks into the prospect of prosecution of those accused 
of perpetrating the most serious crimes of concern and examines the signifi-
cance of ICC prosecution to the people of Darfur. By analyzing relevant in-
ternational precedents and new developments in international criminal law, 
this article examines the state of the law relating to a sitting head of state im-
munity. It assesses whether the ICC indictment of President Omar Hassan Al-
Bashir is politically motivated or a legally justified action against impunity.  
* LL.B, LL.M, Lecturer, St. Mary’s Uni-
versity College, Faculty of Law 
1 Russell Kirk, The Meaning of Justice, 
Heritage Lecture #457, March 4, 1993, 
available at <http://www.heritage.org/
R e s e a r c h / P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y /
HL457.cfm>, accessed 2 November, 
2007. In the legal discipline, while the 
concept of criminal justice is predomi-
nant, restorative or transitional justice is 
evolving as an alternative and/or comple-
mentary to criminal justice. Criminal 
justice or retributive justice requires the 
investigation, prosecution and punish-
ment of perpetrators while transitional 
justice seeks to redress human rights 
abuses on the basis of some principled 
compromises in transitional countries. 
2  See the Updated Set of Principles for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights through Action to Combat Impu-
nity; Econ. and Social Council, E/
CN.4/2005/102/Add.1,8February2005, 
Principle 1-38. 
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1. Understanding the Debate between the Interest of 
Peace and Justice: Which Justice and for Whom? 
[ 
The end of the atrocious conflict that claimed the life of more than a million 
people in Southern Sudan marked the intensification of another conflict on 
the western part of the Country, the Darfur state.3 According to former UN 
Humanitarian Chief, the mayhem in Darfur has claimed the lives of over 
200,000 persons and displaced over 2.5 million people from their livelihood 
since the end of 2005.4 The Government of Sudan (hereinafter the GOS), 
holds that this figure is way too high.5 Since then, Darfur has emerged into 
the international spotlight as an exceptionally dramatic scene of a humanitar-
ian catastrophe.  
Despite mounting pressures against the international community to attend 
to the agony and excruciating physical and psychological trauma sustained by 
the Darfuris, their effort is considered far below expectations.6 The UN Com-
mission of Inquiry on Darfur (hereinafter the UNCI) established pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564 determined that war crimes and crimes 
against humanity have been committed in Darfur.7 Following the report of 
the Commission, the Security Council (hereinafter the Council) has demon-
strated its resolve to bring to justice all those responsible for the mayhem 
while the GOS have dismissed the ICC as a western political instrument. The 
debate over whether the ICC has a just mandate and jurisdictional compe-
tence over the situation in Darfur has remained a matter of greater contro-
versy. However, the raging debate doesn’t seem to change the vernaculars of 
3 North American Institute for Conflict 
Resolution, available at <http://
w w w . c r t r a i n i n g . o r g / l i b r a r y / 
projects/sudan/>, accessed 15 December, 
2008. 
4 United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, As at March, 2006, there are 
200,000 refugees in Chad and more than 
1.7 million IDPs with in Darfur; See also 
Sudanese government estimate of death 
at 9,000, available at <http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darfur_conflict>, 
accessed 15 December,2007.BBC News, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/5347988.stm, last updated on 15 
September 2006. 
5 MSNBC News, Death toll of 200,000 
Disputed in Darfur, Former U.N. chief 
says his estimate in 2006 is too low, Su-
dan says too high, 28 March 2008, avail-
able at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/23848444/>, accessed on 21st of De-
cember, 2008. 
6 See UNSC Resolution 1674, (28 April, 
2006), UN DOC S/RES/1674. [It de-
clares that the Council “Reaffirms the 
provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome Docu-
ment that professes to recognize the re-
sponsibility of the international commu-
nity to protect populations from geno-
cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity”. Attempts at 
unified effort against the Sudan have 
been aborted by the political cynicism 
around the Security Council.  
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international law that the Security Council is a political body with a unique 
set of powers legally authorized to refer situations to the ICC. 
Basic questions capture our attention: what objective can we achieve 
through prosecution and how effective is it  in ensuring contemporary con-
ception of accountability? How can we assess the relative advantages of 
prosecutorial justice vis-à-vis transitional justice in light of the common good 
of the public? If punishment is seen as constituting the centerpiece of ac-
countability, should it be seen as a backward looking exercise in retribution 
or an effort to restore peace and confidence in the rule of law? To what extent 
is responsibility for repression appropriate to the individual victims, as op-
posed to the state, the regime and the international community? To what ex-
tent should understandings of criminal responsibility be projected forward? 
Who should be held to account, and, for what offense and by whom? How do 
we allocate responsibility between responsible civilian leaders placed thou-
sands of miles away from the crime scene and ordinary soldiers and militias 
who actually perpetrated the atrocities? Does prosecution guarantee recon-
ciliation between the Darfuris stripped of all essence of life?  The sections 
below address these issues without, however, claiming to offer conclusive 
answers.  
 
1.1- Why Prosecute Perpetrators? Prosecution as a Matter of 
Principle 
Under criminal law, prosecution is viewed as an instrument of maintaining 
law and order through repression. However, since the notion of individual 
criminal responsibility for atrocities such as Darfur presents a unique set of 
circumstances peculiar to international justice, the conventional understand-
ing of prosecutorial justice is simply unsuited. The stakes are too high and the 
interests too enormous to be effectively rectified with ordinary criminal law 
machineries. And on the other hand, international prosecution is a recent phe-
nomenon, and it mainly traces its roots to the two International Criminal Tri-
bunals established by the Allied Powers following the downfall of the Axis 
Powers.  While some regarded the Nuremberg Trials as fora of victors’ jus-
tice, many believed that the trials ushered into a new era of international indi-
vidual criminal accountability.8  
7 UNSC, Res 1564, (18 September,2004), 
UN DOC S/RES/1564 establishing the 
United Nations Commission of Inquiry 
on Darfur ; Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the 
United Nations Secretary-General pursu-
ant to Security Council Resolution 1564 
of 18 September 2004,Geneva, 25 Janu-
ary 2005, Executive Summary,p-5, avail-
able a <http://www.un.org/News/dh/ 
sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf>, accessed 14 
October, 2007[hereinafter UNCI].  
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For some scholars, prosecution is a matter of principle. They reflect on the 
dynamics of prosecution and its efficacy in establishing accountability to ad-
vance the general good of humanity. Professor Diane F. Orentlicher under-
scored the multifaceted purpose of prosecution. In her view, prosecution is an 
“effective insurance against future repression,” 9 it deters perpetrators and can 
“inoculate the public against future temptations to be complicit” in those 
acts.10 She maintains that prosecution strengthens the rule of law and ad-
vances transition into democracy.11 
Orentlicher also reflects on the consequences of inaction by states for 
gross violations of human rights which she referred to as “atrocious 
crimes.”12 She contends that “a complete failure of enforcement vitiates the 
authority of law itself, sapping its power to deter proscribed conduct.”13 
Starkly putting the case for prosecution and accountability is Joseph Gallo-
way, a military columnist for McClatchy newspaper who contended that: 
“Moderation in the Pursuit of Justice is No Virtue.”14 Writing on the ques-
tionable practices of the Bush Administration on their “global war on terror”, 
Galloway emphatically argued that impunity to those responsible for crimes 
will be “a huge mistake that will come back to haunt them-and all the rest of 
us”.15 
Indeed, Orentlicher’s and Galloway’s arguments are logical, coherent, and 
at par with traditional norms of international law and general conceptions of 
.8 Judgment of Nuremburg Tribunal, Nur-
emberg (1946), 41Am.J.Int.L. 172(1974) 
in Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, 
International Human Rights in Context: 
Law, politics and Morals,(2ed.)( Oxford 
University Press, 2000),p-115-121. The 
jurisprudence of these tribunals provided 
a momentum to the the normative con-
tent of crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. Also, the flourishing ad hoc in-
ternational criminal tribunals and the 
emergence of the ICC elevated this acts 
to an unprecedented level; See Ian 
Brownlie, Principles of Public Interna-
tional Law, (4th ed.), p-562; Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East, available at <http://
w w w . y a l e . e d u / l a w w e b / a v a l o n /
imtfech.htm>. 
9 Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: 
The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100Yale L. 
J, 2537, 2542. 




14 Nat Hentoff, Obama’s First 100 Days: 
After Ending American Torture, Will We 
Prosecutes those who ordered other War 
Crimes? Capital Newspaper, Vol.11, No. 
521, & December 7, 2008,p-2. 
15 Id. He wrote: “what signal does it send to 
Mr. Bush’s gang of unindicted co-
conspirators, who have unwrapped a pan-
dora’s boxful of other offenses-from per-
verting the administration of justice, to 
illegally eavesdropping on the phone 
conversation and emails of ordinary 
Americans…to lying under oath to con-
gressional oversight committees? Etc . . . 
Unless the newly empowered Democrats 
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criminal law. However, others argue that these contentions have failed to suf-
ficiently engage the practical realities of emerging democracies zealously 
awaiting peace and cannot afford to forgo opportunities for peace while pur-
suing complex and lengthy prosecutions.16 While their arguments fully em-
brace the reality of certain societies, it falls short of conceiving underpinning 
mindsets and history of fragile post-conflict societies; societies under con-
tinuing conflict accompanied by brutality and constant state of fear—as in 
Darfur. They of course, dismiss these contentions as a “lesser evil” argument 
and strongly accentuate moral and ethical complications that ensue from their 
opponent’s argument.17 
 
1.2- Challenges to Prosecution: Is Prosecutorial Justice Ade-
quate?  
What is in the interest of justice? Ending a vicious cycle of violent crimes 
and preventing further loss of life or accountability? What if these ends are 
mutually exclusive phenomenon than being mutually reinforcing impera-
tives? That is the contention of this section.  
Neither the experience of the Nuremburg Tribunal nor the recent ad hoc 
international tribunals resolve the impending questions of how transitional 
societies could come to terms with their horrifying past. The immediate good 
of the people in the conflict creates the urgency to first put an end to continu-
ing atrocities without too much emphasis on accountability and reclaiming 
conventional morality. On the other hand, a comprehensive approach to the 
human rights problem demands a proper accounting of the past and the revi-
talization of conventional morality intolerant to impunity.  
Those who resent prosecution in atrocity crimes argue for a “value-
oriented approach to law; that recognizes the intersection of law and legal 
values” to strike an equilibrium between prosecution and other alternatives to 
prosecution, that taken together, serves the common good of the society.18 
They maintain that a ‘social construction’ approach to law, not a strict 
‘positivist approach’, helps craft the "best route to a better future"19 by collec-
tively envisioning and determining "the people we want to be and the com-
   in the White House and on Capitol Hill 
hang a few coyotes on some fences in 
Washington DC., they are making a huge 
mistake that will come back to haunt 
them-and all the rest of us, too”. 
16 See generally Charles Villa-Vicencio, 
infra note 18. 
17 Id at 2544. 
18 John Dugard, in Charles Villa-Vicencio, 
‘Why Perpetrators Should Not Always 
Be Prosecuted: Where the International 
Criminal Court and Truth Commissions 
Meet’ 49 Emory L. J 205,207(2000). 
19 Id. 
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munity we aim to have."20 Others only partly agree with this assertion and 
call for deferral of prosecution only when existing political realities make 
prosecution unlikely; what Jose Zalaquett writing on the Chilean Truth Com-
mission called: “Balancing Ethical Imperatives”.21 
Jose Zalaquett reveals two mutually exclusive but inextricably intertwined 
imperatives seen as defining characteristics of transitional societies — i.e., 
the protection of human rights in situations of armed conflict occasioned by 
violent crimes and the anxiety of elected governments in emerging democra-
cies to prosecute past perpetrators.22  Zalaquett distinguishes the 1945 model 
of prosecution that followed the Second World War 23 from the peculiarities 
of the Argentine situation where the democratically elected government has 
virtually failed to prosecute despite its genuine will to fight impunity of un-
speakable atrocities committed in Argentina’s Dirty War.24  He, therefore, 
contends that “preventing the recurrence of such abuses and, to the extent 
possible, repairing the damage they have caused” should be the two overall 
goals of dealing with past human rights abuses.25 For Jose Zalaquett, meas-
ures to redress past abuses should be pursued only to the extent compatible 
with the interest of peace and the continuity of incipient democracies.26 
What is implied in his notion of “Ethical Imperatives” is the idea that if 
the threat of prosecuting powerful leaders and past perpetrators potentially 
jeopardizes the two crucial ends, transitional societies should be allowed to 
continue until the right moment arrives. However, he contends that perpetra-
tors should be held to account when the time is right, quashing de facto impu-
nity. Putting this account in its most stunning form, he said: “leaders should 
never forget that the lack of political pressure to put these issues on the 
agenda does not mean they are not boiling underground, waiting to erupt.”27  
In an attempt to propose a modus operandi, Charles Villa-Vicencio exam-
ines the purpose served by legal rules and the best approach towards that pur-
pose. 28 However, protesting against the danger of advancing moral argu-
ments under circumstances of brutal conflict, he questions whether the “duty 
to prosecute” is a legal absolute 29 and challenges the utility and practicality 
of this norm for mass atrocity crimes.30 Since the “duty to prosecute” is an 
20 Id. 
21 Jose Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Im-
peratives and Political Constraints: The 
Dilemma of New Democracies Confront-
ing Past Human Rights Violations, 
43Hastings L. J.1425. 
22 Id at 1427. 
23 Id at 1428. 




27 Jose Zalaquett; ‘Why Deal with the 
Past?’ in Alex Boraine et al,  Dealing 
With the Past (eds.) (1997), 8, 15. 





76 MIZAN LAW REVIEW     Vol. 3 No.1,  March 2009 
unrealistic approach to the persistent and recurring sufferings of war-
debilitated nations, Vicencio calls for the deconstruction of the “duty to 
prosecute” norm “to adjust to what is required in a particular situation to 
meet a given goal.”31  
Each conflict and transition is unique and demand unique responses. For 
example, Samuel P. Huntington distinguishes between three different catego-
ries of transitional societies, namely, transformation, replacement and trans-
placement;32 each presenting unique set of problems in the search for jus-
tice.33  According to him, most transitions in the 70’s and 80’s took the model 
of transplacement where the balance between spoilers and the government is 
such that the government, though unwilling to initiate real democratic transi-
tion, is nevertheless ready to be persuaded for negotiation.34 He discusses the 
dilemma these democracies endure and brings into the light a choice of either 
to “prosecute and punish when circumstances allow or forgive and forget.”35 
In conclusion, he blatantly advises societies under this form of transition “not 
to attempt to prosecute authoritarian officials”36 for the cost is far greater than 
the “moral gains;” reducing the whole ideals of legitimacy and the rule of law 
into mere “moral gains.” 
 
1.3- Truth vis-à-vis Prosecution: Mutually Exclusive Objectives 
or Reciprocally Reinforcing Imperatives? 
Neil J. Kritz and Naomi Roht-Arriaza reflected on a different dimension of 
the inadequacy of prosecution in addressing the enormity of the problem and 
the multitudes of competing interests that unfold in transitional societies. In 
their own words: “while meaningful accountability for past human rights 
abuses requires discovery of and reckoning with the truth, . . . proving their 
 




32 Samuel P. Huntington, infra  note 34, 
[emphasis added]. “[i]n transformation, 
those in power in the authoritarian re-
gime take the lead and play the decisive 
role in ending that regime and changing 
it into a democratic system”, “in replace-
ment, reformers within the regime are 
weak or non existent. Democratization 
consequently results from the opposition 
gaining strength and the government 
loosing strength until it collapses or is 
overthrown”. In transplacement, democ-
ratization is produced by the combined 
actions of government and opposition” 
33 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century’, in Neil J. Kirtz, Transitional 
Justice: How Emerging Democracies 
Reckon With Former Regimes, (ed.), V.I, 
United States Institute of Peace,1995, p-
65-66.;See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional 
Justice,(Oxford University Press),(2000)
p-5, [where he debunks our conception of 
the term ‘transition’ itself]. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. [Emphasis added]. 
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occurrence requires a level of cooperation from both perpetrators and trauma-
tized victims that is rarely forthcoming.”37 
If prosecution is to serve as an effective tool for establishing accountabil-
ity, it should be able to address what Kritz and Naomi called a “tradeoff” be-
tween a full disclosure of the truth and the duty to prosecute norm.38 If we 
cannot illicit the truth underlying the atrocities with all the accompanying 
details, prosecution is not truly serving the end of justice. Patrick Burgess 
takes the issue a little further and argued that “punishment will not by itself 
heal the past wounds, which are so commonly the cause of renewed hostili-
ties and the occurrence of new violations.”39 Something of an insurmountable 
significance goes to the essence of these arguments. One is that the classical 
conception of accountability for mass atrocity has changed and it is no more 
limited to the retributive conception of “punishing perpetrators” at any cost. 
The quest for truth to provide consolation for victims, public acknowledge-
ment and apology by responsible individuals, establishing a sound basis for 
reconciliation and democratic transition are among the new imperatives that 
prominently figures into modern conception of accountability. Secondly, if 
the classical conception of prosecution is not capable of addressing the mod-
ern conception of accountability, then there is a need to deconstruct conven-
tional accountability with the view to reinvigorate a mechanism that responds 
to all competing imperatives of justice.  
Accountability for atrocity crimes is not merely about punishing the per-
petrator; it is also about the truth of why the victims have been brutally anni-
hilated. It is about “knowledge and acknowledgment” and making it part of 
the nation’s history.  Alluding to the practice of the South African Truth 
Commission as one success story, Vicencio argues that victims, survivors, 
and perpetrators need to play a crucial role in the national building process.40 
37 Neil J. Kritz and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, 
‘Taking Account of Accountability: 
Transitional Justice: How Emerging De-
mocracies Reckon With Former Re-
gimes, Impunity and Human Rights in 
International Law and Practice’,(Book 
Review), 20-SPG Fletcher F. World Aff. 
157 at 3; The rights of the victims to 
know the truth of what happened and 
why their loved ones are made to disap-
pear. “There are questions to which the 
victim badly needs answers in the ab-
sence of which he will conjure up his 
won….they need to know why particu-
larly his wife, father, daughter, to men- 
    tion a few, were maimed or killed”. 
38 Id. 
39 Patrick Burgess, ‘A New Approach to 
Restorative Justice-East Timor’s Com-
munity Reconciliation Process’ in Naomi 
Roht-Arriaza &Javier Mariezcurrena, 
Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First 
Century: Beyond Truth Versus Justice,
(eds.), (Cambridge University Press),
(2006), p-176. He called for what he 
termed as a dynamic workable solution” 
that advances reconciliation. Account-
ability, he argued, can be essential in 
‘healing the past’ but is neither a re-
sponse to justice nor reconciliation. 
 
 
78 MIZAN LAW REVIEW     Vol. 3 No.1,  March 2009 
He argued that even if we assume that prosecution is the only instrument 
against impunity and is the best way to prove the supremacy of the law, the 
rule of law and the standard of proof makes it almost impossible to “obtain a 
guilty verdict” against powerful perpetrators.41 Prosecution, therefore, not 
only squanders the limited resources of countries in transition, it also deviates 
from its intended purpose.42 
While Vicencio asserts that countering “counterfeit and partisan version of 
history”43 paves the way for a more “rational approaches to past conflicts,” 44 
he falls short of addressing the substantive problems encountered by his no-
tion of “principled compromise”. Other than contending that divulging the 
truth is an “antidote to such ideological perceptions of the past that under-
mine the mind’s capacity for judgment and for learning;”45 he did not offer 
compelling responses as to whether the  disclosure of truth provides a suffi-
cient basis for victims to come to terms with the perpetrators. Allowing per-
petrators to go free in return for truth might intensify existing tensions by di-
vulging the conspiracy and complicity of various institutions. Summarizing 
his argument of principled compromise, Vicencio offered a compelling argu-
ment when he said: 
[T]he inexactitudes of peaceful coexistence and national reconciliation are 
most likely to be born where legal, political and moral absolutes are decalci-
fied under the spotlight of rigorous enquiry and a creative response to politi-
cal realities. Principled compromise that ignores neither the realities of po-
litical context nor the wisdom of judicial insight captured in international 
human rights law can create a sustainable breakthrough toward achieving 
peace and reconciliation.46 
In UNSCR 827 (1993) and 955 (1994) establishing the ICTY and ICTR, the 
Security Council indicated that prosecution of persons responsible for grave 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law will “contribute to ensuring 
that such violations are halted and effectively redressed.”47 The resolution 
proclaims that prosecution of the Rwandan genociders “would contribute to 
40 Id at 207. 
41 Id at 209. 
42 Bruce Ackerman, The Future of the Lib-
eral revolution, cited in Villa Vicencio, 
supra note 18 at 206. 
43 Id at 212.; See also United States Insti-
tute of Peace, Info Advisory #18/T&R, 
C M S N  P r e c e d e n c e ,  F e b r u a r y 
18,1999,available by request at 
usip_requests@usip.org. 
44 Charles Villa-Vicencio, supra note 18, at 
211. 
45 Id. 
46 Charles Villa-Vicencio, supra note 18 at 
206-207. 
47 UNSC. Res. 827 (25 May 1993),UN. 
DOC S/Res/827, establishing the ICTY, 
Preamble; UNSC Res 955 ( 8 November 
1994), UN DOC /Res/955 (1994) estab-
lishing the ICTR, See Preamble. 
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the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance 
of peace”.48  
 
1.4- Between Principle and Pragmatism:  Reconciling  Interests 
While advocates of prosecution strongly argue that retributive justice is the 
means towards combating impunity and ensuring peace and reconciliation, 
others question the practicality of their argument. As Jose Zalaquett, Villa 
Vicencio, and others argued; there are practical difficulties in applying the 
noble principles of conventional retributive justice to the dynamics of socie-
ties in transition—where the military has remained in large control of the 
army, rebel groups and repressive regimes preconditioned peace-talks to am-
nesty. These realities call for new approaches that reconcile different view 
points.  
Martti Ahtisaari, Noble Prize winner and acclaimed Peace-Maker, recog-
nizes the need to punish offenders for a society to make a clean break with its 
horrific past.49 But, he argues that recording past injustice and crafting a plat-
form for national reconciliation is not always best achieved through prosecu-
tion.50 Ahtisaari correctly observed that trials are not always the best instru-
ments for memory and healing and the point should, therefore, be made that 
instead of replacing prosecution with other schemes that engenders a persis-
tent culture of impunity, they should be augmented by other imperatives of 
justice. 
Writing on El Salvadorian Truth Commission, Douglass W. Cassel of-
fered an ingenious  approach to the dilemma of transitional democracies 
when he argued that: “[i]n transitional societies, the accumulation of past hu-
man rights violations may far exceed the capacity of even a competent and 
honest judicial system to prosecute. Moreover, an attempt to prosecute all 
past violators might well provoke security forces to overthrow the incipient 
democratic government.”51 Without ignoring the interest of “incipient democ-
racies” and grounding his argument in international human rights, Cassel 
suggests an array of options that ranges from selective and exemplary prose-
cutions to future prosecutions or Security Council mandated prosecutions.52 
He ruled out de jure amnesty demonstrating the importance of timing; what 
48 Id. 
 
49 Martti Ahtisaari, ‘Justice and Account-
ability: Local or International?’ in 
Ramesh Thakur and Peter Malcontent 
(eds.), From Sovereign Impunity to Inter-
national Accountability: The Search for 
Justice in a World of States, (United Na-
tions University Press,2004),p-xv. 
50 Id. 
51 Douglass W. Cassel, International Truth 
Commissions and Justice, in Niel J. 
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Rachel S. Taylor; writing on “Cambodia’s Joint Tribunal”, called “Better 
Late Than Never.”53 
In a nutshell, while no single approach can fully resolve this debate, it is 
beyond doubt that international law demands prosecution of gross violations 
of human rights and humanitarian law. While Zalaquett’s “ethic of responsi-
bility” provides an imaginative approach with respect to transitional societies, 
Diane’s orientation of prosecutorial justice should always be the acid test in 
all cases: i.e., even if there is a competing interest of peace and transition into 
democracy, prosecution should be considered to the extent practicable. If 
prosecution is impossible or dangerous to the integrity of the nation, a cau-
tious and comprehensive step-based approach suggested by Professor Doug-






2.1- The Duty to Prosecute for Breach of jus cogens Norms 
 
A norm of jus cogens is a preemptory norm of international law that cannot 
be set aside by agreement and “from which no derogation is permitted.” 55 A 
violation of a norm of this nature requires states to investigate, prosecute and 
punish perpetrators.56 Though the content of these norms and how this status 
can be attained is not clear, its distinctive nature and normative superiority is 
beyond dispute. Nevertheless, it is not totally clear how and when a norm of 
jus cogens generates erga omnes obligations despite certain writer’s conten-
tion that obligations erga omnes “pertains to the legal implications arising 
out of a certain crime’s characterization as jus cogens”. 57 
The concept of obligations erga omnes is expounded by the ICJ in the 
Barcelona Traction Case where the court decisively held that: 
 
53 Id at 329; Rachel S. Taylor, ‘Better Later 
Than Never: Cambodia’s Joint Tribunal’, 
in Jane E. Stromeseth, Accountability for 
Atrocities: National and International 
Responses,(Transnational Publishers),
(2003), p-237. 
54 See supra note 51. 
55 The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, Adopted  23 May 1969,entered 
into force on 27 January 1980, 1155 
UNTS,331,344,art.53; M. Cherif Bas-
siouni & Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere 
Aut Judicare, The Duty to Extradite or 
Prosecute in International law, (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/ 
Boston/London,1995),p-51. 
56 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, infra note 58 at 
50. 
57 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International 
Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga 
Omnes, 59 Law &Contemporary Prob-
lems,1996, p-1. 
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[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a state 
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis 
another state in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the 
former are the concern of all states. In view of the importance of the rights 
involved, all states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; 
they are obligations erga omnes.58 
 
According to Cherif Bassiouni, when a prohibition of an act attains the status 
of jus cogens generating erga omnes obligation, it proscribes “the duty to 
prosecute or extradite, state liability, the inapplicability of statute of limita-
tions, the inapplicability of any immunities including the head of state, the 
nullity of defenses of superior order, non-derogation under state of emer-
gency and universal jurisdiction.”59 Though there is no consensus as to a 
complete list of rules of international law that attained the status of a norm of 
jus cogens generating erga omnes obligation, it is beyond dispute that piracy, 
the prohibition on genocide, war crime, crimes against humanity, slavery and 
aggression constitutes a preemptory norm from which derogation is imper-
missible.60 It follows that the question of prosecuting, extraditing or cooperat-
ing in the prosecution of those accused of genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity is not a matter of choice left to the discretion of individual 
states; rather, it is a duty of all states. The GOS is no exception to this rule. 
 
2.1- Duty to Prosecute for Gross Violations of Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law 
Contemporary international human rights impose on the state the duty to in-
vestigate and prosecute for gross violations of human rights and humanitarian 
58 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Co. Ltd, (Belgium v. Spain),1970, ICJ 3, 
32(Feb.5); Reservations to the Genocide 
Convention, (Advisory Opinion), 1951p- 




59 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 57 at 1; 
Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment, ICJ reports(1996),595 at 616; 
For cases of state liability, See Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo
( Democratic republic of the Congo V. 
Uganda),ICJ 3, 19 December 
2005,available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/116/ 
10455.pdf; Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to 
War Crimes and  Crimes Against Hu-
manity, Adopted in 1968, entered into 
force 11 Nov 1970, art, 1; See also ICRC, 
Customary International Humanitarian 
Law ( Cambridge University Press)
(2005),p-603 recognizing  universal ju-
risdiction for war crimes in non-
international armed conflict; Interna-
tional Law Commission, Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, 2Yearbook of International 
Law Commission,(1996), art.7. 
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law.61 The American Convention on Human Rights provides for the “right to 
a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal.”62 The most cited decision of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras Case 
made the duty to “prosecute norm” the central caveat of human rights obliga-
tion and hence significantly influenced thinking about the general obligations 
of states for human rights norms.63 
Furthermore, the Inter-American Court had the occasion to opine on the 
language of “ensure respect” contained in Article 1(1) of the American Con-
vention on Human Rights.64 In its prominent judgment against Honduras, the 
Court has decisively declared that “[A]s a consequence of this obligation, the 
state must prevent, investigate and punish any violations of the rights recog-
nized by the Convention.”65 Today, it is a settled principle in the jurispru-
dence of international human rights that human rights instruments in general 
involves the obligation to respect, prevent, fulfill, and protect violations of 
human rights. 66 
The African Charter to which the Sudan is a party recognizes the right of 
every person to have his cause heard by competent national organs against 
acts violating fundamental rights. 67 The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights correctly emphasized that the Charter as a human rights 
treaty, entails four layers of obligations, namely, the duty to respect, protect, 
promote, and fulfil these rights.68 In interpreting the duty to protect, the Com-
mission has noted that states have the duty to protect the right holders against 
intrusion upon their rights and provide remedy when they are violated. 69 
61 See Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, 
infra note 63; Khashiyev and another v.  
Russia, infra note 77; The Social and 
Economic Rights Action Centre and the 
Centre for Economic and Social Rights / 
Nigeria, infra note 71. 
62 The American Convention on Human 
Rights, Adopted on 22 November 1969, 
entered into force on 18 July, 1978, art.8 
(1), available at< http://www.hrcr.org/
docs/American_Convention/oashr.wpd>, 
accessed 15 December, 2007. 
63 Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights, 1988, 
Ser.C, No.4, 9, Human Rights Law Jour-
nal 212 (1988) in Steiner and Alston, 
supra note 8 at 213. 
64 Id.. 
65 Id. 
66 The Social and Economic Rights Action 
Center and the Center for Economic and 
Social Rights / Nigeria, Comm. No. 
155/96, African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, Fifteenth Annual 
Activity Report, 2001-2002, May 2002, 
Pretoria, South Africa, Para 44, p-6. 
67 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, Adopted 27 June 1981,entered 
into force 21 October, 1986, art.7 (1)(a). 
68 See the Social and Economic Rights Ac-
tion Centre and the Centre for Economic 
and Social Rights / Nigeria, supra note 
66. 
69 Id at para-46, P-7. 
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The European Court of Human Rights decisively pronounced state’s duty 
to carryout a genuine investigation and prosecution of human rights viola-
tions.70 In Khashiyev and another v Russia, the European Court of Human 
Rights has held that a mere attempt to investigate a human rights violation is 
not considered an efficient investigation and states must exercise due dili-
gence necessary within the circumstances to investigate and punish offend-
ers.71  
The Updated Set of Principles on Impunity considers prosecution as a 
conditio sina qua non in the fight against impunity.72 These Principles blame 
the prevalence of impunity on the failure of the state to investigate, prosecute 
and duly punish perpetrators of atrocity crimes.73 Principle 19 articulates a 
state’s duty to prosecute, try and duly punish those responsible for serious 
crimes under international law.74 As a matter of classical international law, 
these Principles on Impunity do not constitute an independent, authoritative, 
and binding source of international law. However, those norms enunciated in 
the document and which pertains to the duty of the state to investigate, try, 
and punish, have already been crystallized into customary rules of interna-
tional law.75 This has been decisively affirmed for the first time by the pro-
nouncements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Velasquez 
Rodriguez Case.76 This landmark judgment by the Court has been considered 
as the most authoritative exposition of the law of human rights and reflects a 
customary norm.77 As a result, it was cited by major human rights bodies and 
70 Vasilev v Bulgaria (App no 48130/99), 
European Court of Human Rights, 
ECHR, 48130/99, 20March, 2007, Para-
75; Khashiyev and another v. Russia 
(App Nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00), 
ECHR, 14 October 2004  and 27 January 
2005,Para-157-158. 
71 Khashiyev and another v. Russia (App 
Nos.5794/00 and 57942/00), ECHR, 14 
October 2004 and 27January 2005,Para--
158.  
72 See generall, the Updated Set of Princi-
ples on Impunity, supra note 2, Principle 
I-V. 
73 Id at Principle I. 
74 Id at Principle 19. 
75 See Velazquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, 
supra note 63; Khashiyev and another v. 
Russia, supra note 70; The Social and 
Economic Rights Action Centre and the 
Centre for Economic and Social Rights / 
Nigeria, supra note 66; Diane F. Or-
entlicher, supra note 9; M. Cherif Bas-
siouni and Edwards M. Wise, supra note 
55. 
 
76 See Velazquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, 
supra note 63. The Court proclaimed that 
the obligation to ‘ensure the free and full 
exercise of the rights recognized by the 
Convention’ implies the “duty of States 
Parties to organize the governmental 
apparatus and, in general, all the struc-
tures through which public power is ex-
ercised, so that they are capable of juridi-
cally ensuring the free and full enjoy-
ment of human rights. 
 
77 See The African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights in The Social and 
Economic Rights Action Centre and the 
Centre for Economic and Social Rights /     
Nigeria, supra note 66; See Henry J Stei- 
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writings of ‘the most highly qualified publicist of the various nations of the 
world’. 78  
 
2.2- Prosecuting the Darfur Atrocities: A Fight Against Impu-
nity or An International Political Hypocrisy? 
 
Before the indictment of Sudanese President, Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, one 
might think that prosecution of persons responsible for serious crimes will 
potentially serve the purpose of justice without compromising peace. After 
Al Bashir’s indictment, though, international organizations and individual 
states have protested against the indictment and requested the Security Coun-
cil to defer the situation in the interest of peace.79 They argued, the prosecu-
tion of Al Bashir jeopardizes the hope for peace and perpetuates the suffering 
of civilians.80 Others argue that instead of jeopardizing the progress towards 
peace and exacerbating the conflict, the indictment will induce the President 
and alleged co-perpetrators to aggressively pursue peace.81 Although there is 
no empirical evidence to that effect, Al-Bashir’s recent declaration of uncon-
ditional and unilateral cease-fire has been viewed as a confidence-building 
measure intended to soften the ICC, the Prosecutor and win the heart and 
minds of his African counterparts.82 
Furthermore, when it is very apparent from the circumstances that the ef-
fort for justice is scuttling efforts for peace, the Security Council has the au-
thority to defer the situation. 83 Since the ICC Statute stipulates for deferral of 
the entire “Situation”, not specific cases, the Council should demand stronger 
measure evidencing commitment by the GOS and rebel forces to make pain-
.  ner and Philip Alston, supra note 8 at 180
-184; James Nickel, How Human Rights 
Generate Duties to Protect and Provide, 
15 Hum. Rts. Q.(1993), 77, P-80. 
78 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, supra 
note 63; Social and Economic Rights 
Action Centre and the Centre for Eco-
nomic and Social Rights / Nigeria, supra 
note 66; Diane F. Orentlicher, supra note 
9; M. Cherif Bassiouni and Edwards M. 
Wise, supra note 55. See the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, infra note 121. 
79 Sudan Tribune, Sudan confident China, 
Russia to block Al-Bashir indictment 4 
August 2008 07:00, available at< http://
www.sudantr ibune.com/spip .php?
article28141>, accessed on 26 January, 
2009. 
80 Id. 
81 Simon Montlake, The Christian Science 
Monitor, Sudan cease-fire call gets wary 
reception in Darfur, Many say the Suda-
nese president is trying to prevent a war-
crimes indictment, 13 November, 2008, 
available at  
   <http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1113/
p99s01-duts.html>, accessed on 14 De-
cember, 2008. 
 82 Id 
83 The Rome Statute of the International 
criminal Court, Text of the Rome Statute 
circulated as document A/CONF.183/9 
of 17 July 1998, entered into force on 1 
July 2002, art.16. 
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ful concessions for peace before it defers the situation. 84 Deferral of the 
“Situation” entails all ICC cases in Darfur, not just the case against Al- 
Bashir.85 However, in an increasingly chaotic region where neither the rebel 
groups nor the GOS are serious about peace, the persistence for justice does 
not, of itself, constitute an impediment to peace.  
Any argument which involves de facto or de jure amnesty to perpetrators 
of atrocity crimes unleash a clash of high normative principles that entails the 
reexamination of the utility of the very norms that are inherent to all legal 
systems. However, the reexamination of the norms, if at all necessary, must 
anticipate possible peace for Darfuris and transition into a democracy that 
guarantees a sustained peace in which human rights and fundamental free-
doms flourish. Even when transition and lasting peace are real possibilities, 
legal and ethical principles exact dispensation of justice in a way that accom-
modates the concerns of victims, the society, and the state.  
Writing on the controversy between peace and justice, Louise Arbour cor-
rectly summarized the appropriate course of action for situations like Darfur 
when she said: “The abandonment—even the postponement—of the process 
of justice is an affront to those who obey the law and a betrayal of those who 
rely on the law for their protection; it is a call for the use of force in revenge 
and, therefore, a bankruptcy of peace.” 86 This view is at par with the view of 
the Council that “justice and accountability are critical to achieving lasting 
peace and security in Darfur.” 87 Consistent with this assertion, Nsongurua J. 
Udombana made an appealing case in the call for justice when he wrote: 
Prosecuting perpetrators of the Darfur mayhem and making reparations to 
victims are essential for victims to come to terms with their loss. Such an 
exercise could have a positive impact on peace and security in Sudan, unless 
peace is intended to be a brief interlude between conflicts. Prosecution also 
has a potential to deter vigilante justice, now or in the future, it will discour-
age those who would want to seek revenge and take justice in their own 
hands.88 
If an all inclusive political process that recognizes difference and upholds 
ideal notions of pluralism and multiculturalism is not instituted, peace will 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Louise Arbor, UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Address to the UN 
Commission of Human Rights in UN: No 
More Delay on Darfur, Human Rights 
Watch,March,18,2005,available at 
<http:/hrw.org/English/doc/2005/03/18/
sudan10337.htm>. See also Nsongurua J. 
Udombana, infra note 98,at ,p-9. 
87 Security Council Resolution 1593/2005, 
31 March, 2006. 
88 Nsongurua J. Udombana, Pay back Time 
in Sudan? Darfur in the International 
Criminal Court, 13 Tul. J. Comp. & Int'l 
L. (2005), 1, 9. 
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simply be a brief interlude between conflicts with various groups. It is im-
perative that the GOS works to restore confidence in the rule of law and re-
press future violations by using prosecution as both a forward and backward 
looking strategy. Until the parties realize the legal and moral obligation to 
honor the dignity and intrinsic worth of their people, they should not be al-
lowed to continue perpetrating atrocities with impunity. 89  
 
3. Security Council Referral of the “Darfur Situation”: 
A Tilted Scale? 
 
3.1- The Security Council Referral: Implications in Darfur and 
Beyond 
When the Security Council has made the first historic referral to the ICC 
amid political standoff, many in the human rights movement believed that the 
referral turned a new page in the history of the human rights movement. In-
deed, Resolution 1553 set forth a profound precedent demonstrating that the 
world can come together to save humanity even in the face of a sharp politi-
cal standoff. This being the clearer message, the indictment of a sitting head-
of-state under this resolution has led some to describe the decision to arraign 
the President as “bad of international law, bad for the Sudanese people -and 
bad for America.” 90 Daniel Hannan accuses the ICC of overturning centuries 
of settled rules of territorial jurisdiction to enforce a covenant against states 
without its expressed or implied consent.91 Whether the referral of the situa-
tion with the implicit consent of those who openly opposed to the Court is a 
tilted scale against the powerless will be discussed later. Though profoundly 
political in nature, it may be said that  the decision was the right-move in the 
right direction. 
The alleged implication of top civilian leaders in the ICC crimes left a 
doubt in the ability of the Sudanese judicial process to genuinely try and pun-
ish suspected perpetrators. That doubt intensified the controversy between the 
ICC and the GOS on how to best handle questions of accountability. At any 
89 Robert K. Goldman, “Amnesty Laws and 
International Law: A Specific Case,” in 
International Commission of Jurists, Jus-
tice Not Impunity 209(Geneva: ICJ, 
1993), in Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Impunity 
and Human Rights in International Law 
and Practice (ed.)( Oxford University 
Press),(1995), p-57. 
90 Daniel Hannan, Americans can Now Be 
Tried By the International Criminal 
Court, 6 March 2009, available at <http://
blogs.telegraph.co.uk/daniel_hannan/
b l o g / 2 0 0 9 / 0 3 / 0 6 / a m e r i c a n s _ 
can_now_be_tried_by_the_international_
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rate, neither peace nor justice will be realized unless the ICC, the Prosecutor, 
and the GOS design a modus operandi, which former UN Secretary General 
Koffi Annan, captured in the following terms: 
Justice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but 
rather, mutually reinforcing imperatives. Advancing all three in fragile post-
conflict settings requires strategic planning, careful integration and sensible 
sequencing of activities. Approaches focusing only on one or another insti-
tution, or ignoring civil society or victims, will not be effective. Our ap-
proach to the justice sector must be comprehensive in its attention to all of 
its interdependent institutions, sensitive to the needs of key groups and 
mindful of the need for complementarity between transitional justice mecha-
nisms.92 
The Prosecutor is expected to craft a workable strategy: striking balance be-
tween competing interests of peace and justice, questions of legitimacy and 
pragmatism, maintaining his independence and securing the cooperation of 
the Sudanese government.  
Beyond Darfur, the referral is a clear signal to states and individuals that 
horrific violations of norms protected under the Rome Statute is inescapable. 
For the three veto wielding states, China, Russia and U.S.A., their abstention 
constitutes a tacit recognition of the ICC and its significance in the interna-
tional criminal justice system. 93 
 
3.2- The International Criminal Court: Whom and How to 
Prosecute 
 
Mass atrocity could not occur without the organized cooperation of many, 
often numbering in several thousands. These include both soldiers of vari-
ous rank and sympathetic civilians in government and private sectors. Their 
cooperation takes innumerable forms, and a satisfactory method for ascrib-
ing particular harms to specific defendants is not always readily at hand. 
This is particularly true of those not physically present at the crime scene. 94 
 
In deciding on the question of whom to prosecute for the atrocities, at least 
two factors must be critically assessed. First, since the ultimate purpose of 
prosecution and punishment is averting mass atrocities ex ante and redressing 
92 Secretary General’s Report to the Secu-
rity Council on the Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies, available at htttp://
s i t e r e s o u r c e s . w o r l d b a n k . o r g /
I N T L A W J U S T I N S T / R e s o u r c e s /
RuleofLawTransitional.pdf>, see sum 
   mary, accessed on 22 October, 2007. 
93 Nsongurua Udombana, supra note 88,
[emphasis added.] 
94 Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: 
Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atroc-
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it ex post, prosecution strategies must take due account of this purpose. Sec-
ondly, given the size of both the victims and the perpetrators, the prosecutor 
must thoroughly assess all the existing options before deciding how many of 
the perpetrators to prosecute.  
The first decision to be made is whether to prosecute the “big fish” or the 
“small fry”.  Accordingly, the question one should ask is whether the gravity 
of atrocities perpetrated by the small fry, who actually committed the acts, 
leads us to the conclusion that endorses punishment of only the big fish. How 
can we make a distinction between the gravity of the acts of the “big fish” 
that have not actually killed but ordered, facilitated or approved those acts 
and those of smaller fry who actually committed the atrocities? On what basis 
may the acts of the subordinates be fairly ascribed to the most elevated supe-
rior, from whom they are so distant in space and time? Should the prosecutor 
follow the precedents of the ICTY prosecutors who have relied upon the doc-
trine of participation in a joint criminal enterprise? Should it invoke com-
mand responsibility? So far, the two current indictments against the Presi-
dent, the State Minister and the militia leader supports the view that the 
Prosecutor is going to pursue the big fish that bears the greatest responsibility 
for the atrocities.  
 
3.3- ICC and the ‘Special Criminal Courts on the Events in  
Darfur’: The Challenges of Complementarity 
The most decisive power of the ICC derives from the Principle of Comple-
mentarity enunciated in Article 17 of the Statute and underpins the entire 
functioning of the Court. Complementarity is a check on the absolute west-
phalian notion of sovereignty. The drafters of the Rome Statute were mindful 
of the many examples of sovereigns on the international arena and designed 
Article 17 to govern the conduct of those who let horrendous atrocities go 
unpunished. In addition to numerous other checks on the ICC’s powers, the 
Complementarity regime allows “prosecutorial prerogatives of responsible 
states to use their forums to enforce international law95  while at the same 
time providing for a back-up tribunal to step in and trump traditional sover-
eignty claims for failed or recalcitrant regimes.” 96 
Sudan is not a State Party to the ICC. UNSCR 1593 (2005) provided ICC 
with jurisdiction. The Rome Statute bestows primary jurisdiction on the 
states to prosecute crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. 97 While 
95 Larry Charles Dembowski, The Interna-
tional Criminal Court: Complementarity 
and Its Consequences, in Jane E. Storm-
seth, Accountability for Atrocities; Na-
tional and International Responses,
(Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, New 
York),(2003) at p-140. 
96 Id. 
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state jurisdiction is the rule, ICC jurisdiction is exercised in exceptional cir-
cumstances if the state’s unwillingness or inability to genuinely exercise ju-
risdiction over the accused.98  In the case of Darfur, the question will be 
whether the Sudanese Special Criminal Courts on the Events in Darfur 
(hereinafter the SCCED) 99 setup to replace the ICC can legally override ICC 
jurisdiction. 
The preamble to the Rome Statute declares that “most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community must not go unpunished” 100 and it is 
the duty of every state to “exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those respon-
sible for international crimes”. 101 There is no doubt that Sudan has primary 
jurisdiction to redress the wrongs committed within its own territories. How-
ever, the GoS have expressed their opposition to the Security Council refer-
ral102 and they have opined that the SCCED is “considered a substitute to the 
International Criminal Court”.103 Self-serving as those arguments appear to 
be and, of course they were, they cannot be automatically dismissed.  
The ICC jurisdiction is contingent upon proof by the Prosecutor that the 
national system is either unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate and 
prosecute the perpetrators.104 Indeed, it has been determined that the Suda-
nese legal system is either unwilling or unable to deal with the atrocities 
committed in Darfur. In the words of the UNCI: 
The Sudanese justice system is unable and unwilling to address the situation 
in Darfur. … Laws in force in Sudan today contravene basic human rights 
standards. Sudanese criminal laws do not adequately proscribe war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, such as those carried out in Darfur, and the 
Criminal Procedure Code contains provisions that prevent the effective 
prosecution of these acts.105 
97 The Rome Statute, supra note 83, article 
17(1)(a) providing that the “Court shall 
determine that a case is inadmissible 
where it is being investigated or prose-
cuted by a state which has jurisdiction 
over it, unless the states is unwilling or 
unable genuinely to carryout investiga-
tions…” Emphasis added. 
 
98 The Rome Statute, supra note 83 at 
art.17. 
 
99 Human Rights Watch: Special Courts 
Not Prosecuting War Crimes, Nairobi, 8 
June 2006, available at <http://
w w w . i r i n n e w s . o r g / r e p o r t . a s p x ?
reportid=59255>, Accessed: 20 August 
2008. 
100 The Rome Statute, supra note 83, Pre-
amble Para-4. 
101 Id at Preamble,Para-6. 
102 Nairobi, 24 June 2005 (IRIN); Sudan's 
own judiciary was qualified and ready to 
try those accused of any violations in 
Darfur.” The GOS declared its "total 
rejection" of UNSCR 1593, accusing the 
ICC of lacking justice and objectivity. 
103  Id.  
104 The Rome Statute, supra note 83, art.17. 
105 UNCI, supra note 7 at 5. 
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However, since the finding of the UNCI predates the establishment of the 
SCCED, the Prosecutor must prove to the satisfaction of the Trial Chamber 
that his case is admissible and investigation by the SCCED falls short of the 
requirements of Article 17. The principle of complementarity limits the 
power of the ICC by creating a procedural hurdle to the admissibility of cases 
and in a way safeguards the rights of the state whose legal system is prepared 
to pursue alleged perpetrators. All that Sudan is expected to prove is that it is 
willing and able to genuinely prosecute the individuals on the list of the 
Prosecutor’s indictment for the same conduct alleged by the Prosecutor.  
The two Prosecutor’s cases relate to the President of the Republic, Omar 
Hassan Al Bashir and Ahmed Harun (Former Minister of State for the Inte-
rior) and Ali Kushayb (Janjaweed militia leader) for “a systematic and organ-
ized initiative to attack civilian populations in Darfur”.106  In the Prosecutor 
v. Thomas Lubango, the Pre-Trial Chamber has enunciated the admissibility 
requirements of the Statute when it pronounced that: “it is a conditio sine qua 
non for a case arising from the investigation of a situation to be inadmissible 
that national proceedings encompass both the person and the conduct which 
is the subject of the case before the Court”.107 On its decision on the Prosecu-
tor’s application for an arrest warrant for Ahmed Harun and Ali Kusheyb, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber pronounced that the case is admissible and falls within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.108 
In the case against Ahmed Harun and Ali Kusheyb, the Prosecution has 
shown that there is no national proceeding at all against Ahmed Harun in 
connection with Darfur for any of the alleged crimes.109  In the case of Ali 
Kushayb, the SCCED has launched an investigation involving him and an-
106 The International Criminal Court, Fifth 
Report of the Prosecutor of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593(2005)
(hereinafter Fifth Report of Prosecutor to 
the UNSC or simply The Fifth Report), p
-8, available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/
library/organs/otp/ OTP_ReportUNSC5-
Darfur_English.pdf.>, accessed on 20 
September 2008. 
107 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Situation in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo, Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application 
for a Warrant of Arrest Pursuant to Arti-
cle 58 of the Rome Statute Case No.ICC-




108 Prosecutor v. Ahmed Muhammad Harun 
(“Ahmed Harun”) and Ali Muhammad 
Al-Abd-Al-Rahman(“Ali Kushayb), 
Situation in Sudan, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Decision on the Prosecution Application 
under Article 58(7) of the Statute, 
No.ICC-02/05-01/0, The Fifth Report, id 
at 7-8. 
109 Fifth Report of the Prosecutor to the UN 
Security Council, supra note 106. 
110 See Report of Human Rights Watch, 
available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/
ij/sudan0606/1.htm; The Fifth Report at 
p-7. 
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other 12 individuals against whom a prima facie evidence has been found. 110 
However, those investigations are for a separate incident of a very marginal 
nature compared to the prosecution’s case and they are not related to those 
investigated by the prosecutor.111  In summarizing the matter in which the Pre
-Trial Chamber has ruled in his favor, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo said: 
There is no investigation in the Sudan into such a criminal conduct. The 
Sudanese investigations do not encompass the same persons and the same 
conduct which are the subject of the case before the Court. To the extent 
that the investigations do involve one of the individuals named in the prose-
cution, they do not relate to the same conduct which is the subject of the 
case before the Court. National proceedings are not in respect of the same 
incidents and address a significantly narrower range of conduct. 112 
 
While the individuals are suspected of committing war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, trying them for theft and slaughter of a herd of sheep ap-
pears as an insult to the victims and constitutes an audacious affront to inter-
national standards against impunity. This is indeed a typical manifestation of 
the inability and unwillingness of the system to prosecute perpetrators and 
one intended to shield them from international prosecution—making the ICC 
prosecutions all the more important. Thus, SCCED prosecutions do not meet 




3.4- Cooperation with the ICC: A Legal Obligation or an Inter-
national Political Expedience? 
As early as 1973, the UN General Assembly adopted a historic resolution 
which required all states to cooperate in the punishment, detection, arrest and 
extradition of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 113 
Both the Geneva Conventions and the Torture Convention contains explicit 
provisions dealing with prosecution or extradition of persons guilty of grave 
breaches and torture. 114 It is now an established norm of customary interna-
 
111 Fifth Report of the Prosecutor to the UN 
Security Council, supra note 106. 
 
112 The Prosecutor v. Ahmed Muhammad 
Harun (“Ahmed Harun”)and Ali Mu-
hammad Al-Abd-Al-Rahman(“Ali Ku-
shayb), supra note 108, p-9. 
 
113 GA Res. 3074(XXVIII), Principles of 
International Cooperation in the Detec-
tion, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment 
of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity, UN Doc. 
A/9034/Add1(1973). 
114 See The Four Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949,Geneva  I at art.49, Geneva 
II, at art.50, Geneva III, at art.129, Ge-
neva IV, at art.146; UN Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, in force 26 June 1987, art.5(2), 8. 
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tional law that all states have obligation aut dedere aut judicare, to prosecute 
or extradite offenders of preemptory norms of international law. 115 
Mark Lattimer and Philippe Sands maintain that in most cases, interna-
tional human rights impose an obligation on state to prosecute or to cooperate 
in their prosecution rather than licensing them to abuse human rights with 
impunity.116 In its concluding observation on Sudan, the Human Rights Com-
mittee urged the GOS to respect its duty to prosecute perpetrators of human 
rights and cooperate with the ICC. 117 As stated by Juan Mendez, Former 
Special Advisor of the Secretary General on Genocide, “cooperation with the 
ICC is not a matter of choice for any state”. 118 Moreover, UNSCR 1593, a 
Chapter VII resolution, required the Sudan to cooperate with the ICC. 119 Ac-
cusing the ICC for lack of “objectivity and justice”, and contrary to its inter-
national obligation, the Sudan has totally rejected the ICC and UNSCR 
1593.120 In its decision issuing an arrest warrant for President Hassan Al-
Bashir, the Pre-Trial Chamber reiterated the position of the GOS and their 





Omar Hassan Al-Bashir is the President of the Republic of Sudan since 1989. 
Ever since he assumed power in June of that year, he has engaged in a con-
stant political and military battle with his adversaries from within and outside 
Khartoum.122  In May of 2007, the judges of the ICC issued an arrest warrant 
115 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 57. 
116 M. Lattimer & P. Sands QC, Justice for 
Crimes Against Humanity (ed.),(Hart 
Publishing: 2003), p-4. 
117 The Human Rights Committee, Consid-
eration of Reports Submitted By States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, 
CCPR/C/SDN/CO/3/CRP.1,26 July 
2007,p-3, available at <http://
www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/
refworld/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?
docid=46e516f52>, accessed on 18 De-
cember 2007. 
118 See Juan Mendez, Former UN Secretary 
General’s Special Advisor on Genocide, 
available at <http://www.irinnews.org/
report.aspx?reportid=56662>, accessed  
     on the 27 July 2008. 
119 UNSCR 1593, Preamble. 
120 IRIN, SUDAN: Judiciary Challenges 
ICC over Darfur Cases, supra note 102. 
121 The International Criminal Court, Deci-
sion on the Prosecution’s Application for 
a Warrant of Arrest against Omer Hassan 
Ahmed Al-Bashir, Case No: ICC-02/05-
01/09, Para-228, 229. The Chamber spe-
cifically referred to one incident in which 
it noted “that the embassy of the State of 
Sudan in The Hague, The Netherlands, 
refused on 2 May 2007 and 11 June 
2007, to receive from an officer from the 
Court's Registry, the cooperation request 
for the arrest and surrender of Ahmad 
Harun and Ali Kushayb”. 
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for Ahmed Haroun and Ali kusheyb.123 On 14 May, 2008, Albashir publicly 
declared that he “will not hand-over Haroun or any Sudanese to the ICC.”124 
Having failed to secure the cooperation of Sudanese President, Hassan Al 
Bashir, in the apprehension and surrender of Ahmed Harun and Ali Kusheyb, 
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo turned to the Commander-in-Chief himself.125  
Accusing him for the most atrocious crimes imaginable: genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, the Prosecutor has made an unprecedented 
move in indicting a sitting Head-of-State.126 Requesting an arrest warrant for 
the President, the Prosecutor made his toughest allegation claiming that “As 
Al Bashir  decided  and set out to destroy in part the Fur, Masalit and  Zab-
ghwa groups,  on  account  of  their  ethnicity.  His motives were largely po-
litical. His pretext was a “counterinsurgency”. His intent was genocide.”127 
Despite his allegation, the decision of the OTP to indict Al Bashir has re-
ceived a mixed reaction from around the world. While the African Union, the 
Arab League and many individual African leaders expressed disappointment 
and outrage at the decision of the Prosecutor, human rights activists have 
hailed the decision as a major breakthrough ushering in a new era in which 
those who are given the most power to do harm or good will be held to the 
“highest standards of international law, not the lowest.” 128 
Sudanese neighbor, Ethiopia, has expressed its discontent with the indict-
ment calling it a “single minded pursuit of justice.”129 The Ethiopian Premier 
linked his country’s opposition to the indictment with the interest of peace, 
122 The ICC, Situation in Darfur, The Su-
dan, Summary of the Case, Prosecu-
tor’s  Application  for  Warrant  of  Arrest  
under  Article 58 Against Omar  Hassn Al 
Bahir, 14 July 2008, p-3. 
123 See supra note 108 at 11. 
124 Eighth  Report  of  the  ICC Prosecutor  
to  the  UNSC pursuant to 
UNSCR  1593  (2005), para-50. 
125 The ICC, Situation in Darfur, The Sdan, 
supra note 122 at page 3, English Report 
of  the  ICC Prosecutor to  the  UNSC, id 
at para-25, arguing that “Mr. Al Bashir as 
President and Commander in chief of the 
Armed Forces exercises both de jure and 
de facto authority. He provided direc-
tions to the operations against the civil-
ians in Darfur. While he delegated au-
thority to his subordinates, supreme au-
thority was always his. He ensured the 
coordination of operations through the 
State administration and through Locality 
and State Security Committees reporting 
to him. He participated personally in the 
recruitment and direction of Militia/
Janjaweed incorporated into reserve 
forces. The events that occurred in Dar-
fur, in particular their systematic and 
planned nature could not have occurred 
without his approval and will.”   
126 UNSCR 1593, supra note 87. 
127 The ICC, The Situation in Darfur, The 
Sudan, Summary of the Case, supra note 
122, p-3.  
128 Gilbert Sison, A King No More: The 
Impact of The Pinochet Decision on the 
Doctrine of Head of State Immunity, 78 
Wash. U. L.Q. 1583, 1584. 
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which according to him should not be trumped by the concern for justice.130 
Expressing his country’s stance on the indictment of Al Bashir, the Ethiopian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, H.E. Seyoum Mesfin, condemned any crimes 
against civilians and declared the indictment as unfair and unbalanced. 131 Eri-
trea on its part dismissed the indictment calling it an “insult” and 
“harassment” by the Western powers. 132 On the other hand, the Former U.S. 
Special Envoy to Sudan, Andrew Natsios has expressed his frustration over 
the indictment holding that the indictment: 
 . . . [m]ay well shut off the last remaining hope for a peaceful settlement for 
the country. Without a political settlement, Sudan may go the way of Soma-
lia, pre-genocide Rwanda, or the Democratic Republic of Congo: a real po-
tential for widespread atrocities and bloodshed as those in power seek to 
keep it at any cost. 133 
Furthermore, the African Union, a body with unequivocal power to use mili-
tary force against Member States to prevent gross violations of human rights, 
134 expressed concern that such a pursuit of justice targeting the President of 
the Nation would only scuttle the effort for peace.135  The AU Peace and Se-
curity Council anticipated the situation earlier; warning that any effort aimed 
at “justice should be pursued in a way that does not impede or jeopardize ef-
forts aimed at promoting lasting peace in Sudan.”136  This Council has ex-
pressly condemned the move by the ICC prosecutor and called upon the Pre-
Trial Chamber to refrain from issuing an arrest warrant against Hassan Al 
Bashir saying that “approval by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the application by 
the ICC Prosecutor could seriously undermine the ongoing efforts aimed at 
facilitating the early resolution of the conflict in Darfur and the promotion of 
long-lasting peace and reconciliation in the Sudan.”137 
129 Sudan Tribune, Ethiopia Voices Support 
to Sudan over ICC Charges Against Al 
Bashir, Monday, Tuesday 29 July 2008, 
available at < http://
www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?>, ac-
cessed on 10 November, 2008. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132  Id. 
133  Andrew Natsios, ICC Prosecution of 
Bashir May Destroy Sudan, in Larouche 
Political Action Committee, available at 
< h t t p : / / w w w . l a r o u c h e p a c . c o m /
news/2008/07/16/icc-prosecution-bashir-
may-destroy-sudan-says-former-u-s-
spe.html>, accessed on 12 December, 
2008. 
134 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15, adopted at 
Lomé, Togo on the 11th of July, 2000, 
entered into force May 26, 2001, art.4 
(h). Authorizing the 'Union to intervene 
in a Member State’ pursuant to a decision 
of the Assembly in respect of grave cir-
cumstances, namely war crimes, geno-
cide and crimes against humanity”. 
135 Id. 
136 African Union Peace and Security 
Council, 141st Meeting, 11July 2008, 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
137 The Peace and Security Council, the 
African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
21 July 2008, Para-9. 
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According to African diplomatic sources familiar with Sudan and its po-
litical culture, "there are only two options for Sudan: progress toward a politi-
cal settlement, or else chaos, war, and a failed state".138 The AU and the Arab 
League have called upon the Security Council to defer the prosecution.139 
Within the Security Council itself, four members of the Council; Russia, 
China, Republic of South Africa and Libya have asked the Council to sus-
pend the indictment for one year invoking the ‘interest of peace’ that empow-
ers the Council to defer cases. 140  
For human rights groups, the indictment was considered a momentous vic-
tory for the global human rights enterprise. 141 For example, Africa Action, a 
Washington based human rights organization, dismissed the contention of the 
African Union, the Arab League and some regional leaders stating that “[T]
he notion that, in this case, the pursuit of justice will scuttle a peace process 
for Darfur is misguided.”142 Human Rights Watch referred to Al Bashir’s in-
dictment as a “dramatic development” and called upon the African Union not 
to seek deferral, warning that such a move is tantamount to a denial of 
“redress to the victims of atrocities in Darfur.” 143 
Despite the political earthquake that followed Al-Bashir’s indictment, the 
Pre-Trial judges have found a reasonable ground to believe that two counts of 
“war crimes within the meaning of articles 8(2)(e)(i) and 8(2)(e)(v) of the 
138 See Larouche Political Action Commit-
tee, supra note 133. 
139 The Sudan Tribune, Islamic Countries 
Ask UN Defer ICC Move Against Sudan 
President, 5 August, 2008, available at 
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?
article28159,>, accessed on 13 January 
2009. 
140 Human Rights Watch, ICC Prosecutor 
Requests Arrest Warrant for Sudan’s 
President, available at <http://
www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/08/09/icc-
prosecutor-requests-arrest-warrant-sudan
-s-president>, accessed on 12 December, 
2008. 
141 Charles Pierson, Pinochet And The End 
Of Immunity: England's House Of Lords 
Holds That A Former Head Of State Is 
Not Immune For Torture, 14 Temp. Int'l 
& Comp. L.J. 263, 263. 
142 Africa Action, “Al Bashir’s Prosecution, 
Bold Step for Justice, Peace in Sudan”,15 
July 2008, available at <http://
www.panapress.com/newslatf .asp?
code=eng044728&dte=15/07/2008>,  
“The people of Darfur are strongly sup-
portive of holding those responsible for 
genocide and crimes against humanity 
accountable, and the ICC is the only 
mechanism capable of fulfilling that role 
at this time,” Gerald LeMelle, executive 
director of Africa Action, said in a state-
ment. 
 
143 Human Rights Watch, “AU: Do Not 
Call for Suspending ICC’s Investigation 
of President al-Bashir”, A Letter Ad-
dressed to H.E. Mr. Kabinga Pande, For-
eign Minister of Zambia, available at 
< h t t p : / / w w w . h r w . o r g / e n /
news /2008 /09 /19 /au-do-no t - ca l l -
suspending-iccs-investigation-president-
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Statute” 144 and five counts of “crimes against humanity of murder, extermi-
nation, forcible transfer, torture and rape, within the meaning of articles 7(l)
(a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) respectively of the Statute, throughout the Darfur re-
gion, pursuant to the GoS policy to unlawfully attack were committed by 
GoS forces.”145 The Court has thrown out genocide charges by a two-one ma-
jority on the basis of insufficient evidence indicating Al-Bashir’s direct or 
indirect intent to exterminate the alleged groups in whole or in part consistent 
with the rules of international law.146 In finding Al Bashir’s indirect responsi-
bility for the two counts of war crimes and five counts of crimes against hu-
manity, the Chamber found the GoS collectively responsible for designing 
and implementing a “common plan to carryout a counter-insurgency cam-
paign” the core component of which constitutes the unlawful attack of civil-
ian populations belonging to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa.147 In establishing 
a legal nexus between the GoS and Al Bashir, the Chamber saw the President 
as the de jure and de facto head of the state of Sudan and found a “reasonable 
ground to believe that Omar Al Bashir is criminally responsible under article 
25(3)(a) of the Statute as an indirect perpetrator, or as an indirect co-
perpetrator, for those war crimes and crimes against humanity”148 and issued 
an arrest warrant for his arrest and transfer to The Hague, The Netherlands.149  
 Although the indictment and even prosecution of a sitting Head of State 
for alleged violations of jus cogens norms is not unprecedented, Al Bashir’s 
case is not uncontroversial. One of the controversies relates to the referral of 
the “Situation” to the ICC. Since the Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute 
and bears no obligation towards the Court, the ICC can only intervene 
through Security Council authorization. Also, the referral of the “Situation” 
was done at least with the tacit consent of veto wielding political powers such 
as USA, China, and Russia-countries that denied jurisdiction to the ICC and 
in some cases gone to the extent of engaging in conduct contrary to the pur-
pose and object of the Rome Statute.150 As a result, some see the President’s 
indictment as politically motivated.151 After the Chamber’s decision to issue 
the arrest warrant, many accused the Court as a new face of imperialism and 
144 The International Criminal Court, supra 
note 121 at Para-78. 
145 Id at Para-109. 
146 Id at Paras, 204-206. Dismissing the 
Prosecution’s allegation, the Chamber 
held that “the Majority finds that the ma-
terials provided by the Prosecution in 
support of the Prosecution Application 
fail to provide reasonable grounds to 
believe that the GoS acted with dolus 
specialis/specific intent to destroy in 
whole or in part the Fur, Masalit and 
Zaghawa groups, and consequently no 
warrant of arrest for Omar Al Bashir 
shall be issued in relation to counts 1 to 
3”. 
147 Id at Paras- 213-215. 
148 Id at Para-223. 
149 Id at Para-248. 
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asking whether President Bush and his aides or those who massacred children 
and women in the Gaza Strip will be equally subjected to this supra-national 
form of justice.152 However, the history of prosecution of a head-of state has 
never been a politically neutral process and the debate is likely to continue.153  
The Constitution of the ICC devised a prudent system that envisioned a 
world free of impunity for gruesome and violent crimes.154 The Statute is 
premised on the principle that “there can be no impunity for perpetrators of 
genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.”155 To bring recalcitrant 
non-state-parties to the attention of the Court, the Statute authorized the Se-
150 See Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, The 
Prosecution and Defense of Peacekeepers 
under International Law, (Transnational 
Publishers, Ardsley: 2004), at 261; See 
also UNSC Res. 1422/2002 and Res. 
1487/2003; When the entry into force of 
the ICC Statute approached, the United 
States asked the Security Council to 
grant immunity for peacekeepers in East 
Timor. The proposal was rejected and the 
United States warned the Council that it 
will consider withdrawing from present 
and future peacekeeping operations. 
When the Council was convened in 2002 
to renew the mandate of the Peacekeep-
ing operation in Bosnia, a NATO opera-
tion authorized by the Security Council, 
the US introduced a resolution that pro-
vided immunity for all military and civil-
ian personnel and it was again rejected 
by the Council. As a result of the USA 
veto, the mandate of the Bosnia operation 
was extended three times for few days, 
days and finally after the adoption of the 
immunity resolution 1422, the mandate 
was renewed for six months. 
151 Sudan Tribune, Ethiopia Voices Support 
to Sudan over ICC Charges Against Al 
Bashir, supra note 129; Peter Clottey, 
African Union Demands Security Coun-
cil Suspend ICC Indictment of Bashir, 22 
July 2008, available at <http://
www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008
- 0 7 / 2 0 0 8 - 0 7 - 2 2 - v o a 2 . c f m ?
CFID=78687203&CFTOKEN=1930998
5>, accessed on the 10th of Dec., 2008. 
152 D'Escoto, President of the UN General 
Assembly: Bush Should Stand Trial, 
FARS News Agency, 07-03-2009, avail-
able at <http://english.farsnews.com/
newstext.php?nn=8712171148>, ac-
cessed on 9 March 2009; Robert Parry, 
War Crimes and Double Standards, 8 




accessed on 9 March, 2009. 
153 The history of international prosecution 
of individuals has never been free of po-
litical alignments. The Nuremburg Tribu-
nal is notorious for its politicization, and 
so was the trial of Slobodan Milosevic 
and Charles Taylor. This, however, does 
not mean that there are not good reasons 
to believe that those individuals were 
criminally responsible. The “Darfur 
Situation” is no exception. 
154 The referral by the Security Council is 
devised to deter unwilling states to re-
frain from engaging in egregious crimes 
offensive to common values and con-
science of the global community. It is 
defining of state’s determination to put 
an end to recurrent culture of impunity 
that plagued post conflict societies. 
155 See Statement by Mr. Luis Moreno 
Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court, Statement to the United 
Nations Security Council pursuant to 
UNSCR 1593 (2005) , 5 June 2008. 
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curity Council to refer atrocities in their territory to the Prosecutor.156 How-
ever, this does not change the fundamentally undemocratic nature of the Se-
curity Council resulting in the politicization of an independent judicial insti-
tution meant to repress heinous atrocities against humanity. 
Traditionally, international law has recognized both procedural and sub-
stantive immunity for a Head of State and diplomats.157 Though the Head of 
State immunity is not explicitly delineated in the Vienna Convention on Dip-
lomatic Relations, it originates from a customary understanding of sovereign 
immunity deemed inseparable and indivisible from the leader of the state.158 
Customarily, “the immunity granted to the Head of State was seen as an ex-
tension of the immunity granted to the state itself.”159 Although the concept 
survived to the recent date, its importance was significantly reduced with the 
shift in emphasis from the sacrosanct conception of sovereign equality to the 
recognition of the overarching role of human rights culminating into individ-
ual liberty and accountability.160 Former Czech President, Václav Havel em-
phatically stated that: “[t]he enlightened efforts of generations of democrats, 
the terrible experience of two world wars--which contributed to the adoption 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights-- have finally brought human-
ity to the recognition that human beings are more important than the state”.161 
 
156 Id. 
157 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Has the Time 
Come to Revise the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act? 88 Am. Soc'y. Int'l. L. 
Prac. 509, 512 (1994) (as reported by 
Mark S. Zaid, Sovereign Immunity: A 
Comparative Perspective, 88 Am. Soc'y 
Int'l L. Proc. 509, 512 (1994)) in Gilbert 
Seson, supra note 128 at 1586.  “The 
famous remark of King Louis XIV of 
France, “L'etat, c'est moi” (I am the 
state), best represents this notion of the 
state and the head of state being thought 
of as one and the same”. 
158 Tachiona v Mugabe, 2001 US Dist. 
LEXIS 18712, 33-34 (US S.D. NY 
2001), See judge Victor Marrero’s hold-
ing that:  “There is now growing recogni-
tion that the sovereign is solely the state 
and that the nation’s ruler is a distinct 
entity”. 
159 Joseph W. Dellapenna, supra note 157 
at 1585; Tachiona v Mugabe, id at p- 148 
at 33; Heidi Altman, The Future of Head 
of State Immunity: The Case against 
Ariel Sharon, April 2002, at p-4, avail-
able at <http://www.indictsharon.net/
heidialtman-apr02.pdf>., accessed on 25 
November, 2008. 
160 See U.N. Draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind 
(1996) art. VII.; Draft Code on Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Man-
kind, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (Jul. 8, 
1996), reprinted in Lyal S. Sunga, The 
Emerging System of International Crimi-
nal Law: Developments in Codification 
and Implementation, Annex VI 435-45 
(1997); Cf. Nuremberg Charter, art. 7. 
161 Václav Havel, Kosovo and the End of 
the Nation-State, N.Y. Rev. of Books, 
June 10, 1999, at 4 (reprinting President 
Havel's address to the Canadian Senate 
and the House of Commons in Ottawa, 
Canada on April 29, 1999) in Charles 
Pierson, supra note 141 at 263  
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With this progressive evolution of international law, the place of the indi-
vidual in the context of international human rights has continued to grow as 
the value placed on state sovereignty consistently declined.162  This decline in 
sovereignty is marked by a decline in immunity for heads of states and diplo-
matic officials with respect to preemptory norms; norms that are considered 
by the international community as deep-seated and worthy of serious protec-
tion.  
The end of the First World War marked the first time a head of state im-
munity came into question when the Treaty of Versailles signed between the 
belligerent parties called for a public arraignment of the then Emperor of 
Germany, William II of Hohenzollern.163 In the aftermath of WWII, the Lon-
don Charter declared official position of those accused of heinous crimes as 
irrelevant to a finding of criminal responsibility and punishment.164 Although 
these trials were considered as victor’s justice, the Nuremburg Principles 
have been crystallized into customary norms of international law. 165  
Moreover, the atrocities committed in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
has brought about a decisive blow to the concept of Head of State immunity. 
Article 7(2) of the Statute of the ICTY and Article 6(2) of the Statute of the 
ICTR declares that “[t]he official position of any accused person, whether as 
Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall 
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punish-
ment.”166 Rejecting the argument by amici pleading a head of state immunity 
on behalf of the late Slobodan Milosevic, the Court emphatically pronounced 
that Article 7(2) is a restatement of customary rule of international law.167 
This holding of the ICTY marked the first time an international tribunal un-
equivocally rejected substantive immunity for sitting Head of State for crimes 
of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.168 
162 Heidi Altman, supra note 159 at p-4. 
163 Treaty of Versailles, 22 June 1919, art. 
227 in Heidi Altman, supra n. 159, p-8. 
164 Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major 
War Criminals of the European Axis 
(“London Agreement”) (Aug. 8, 1945), 
59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in 39 Am. J. Int’l 
L. 258(Supp.1945). art. 7; William Scha-
bas, Enforcing International Humanitar-
ian Law: Catching the Accomplices,  
    83Int’l Rev. Red Cross 439,440(2001). 
165 General Assembly Resolution  95(I); 
See also Report by the International Law 
Commission on Principles of the Nurem-
burg Tribunal, Yearbook of the ILC, 
1950, vol. II, p.195.  
166 The Statute of the ICTY, supra note 47 
at art. 7(2); Statute of the ICTR, supra 
note 47 at art. 6(2). 
167 See Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, 
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Monumental in this regard is the decision of the UK House of Lords in the 
Pinochet that represented a real change in the international law doctrine of 
the head of state immunity.169 In the Pinochet, a five-member panel of the 
House of Lords pronounced that a former head of state is entitled to immu-
nity from criminal process for official acts committed in the performance of 
official duties.170 However, the majority decision, though a tiny majority, af-
firmed that egregious acts “condemned as criminal by international law can-
not amount to acts performed in the exercise of the [official] functions of a 
head of state”. 171 According to the majority reasoning, because torture and 
hostage taking are contrary to preemptory norms of international law, they 
cannot constitute “official functions” of a head of state for which immunity is 
available. 172 
Although the Pinochet ruling dealt with a much narrower aspect of immu-
nity within the context of the English Extradition Statute,173 the case sets a 
momentous precedent in its pronouncement that a former head of state cannot 
enjoy an absolute immunity for appalling crimes of the most serious concern 
to the world. Since “violent crimes of exceptionally serious gravity and con-
sequence to the victims and the international community” cannot in anyway 
amount to “official functions” of the head of state, the majority in the case 
did not find a legal rationale to bestow immunity on Ugarte Pinochet for acts 
of torture.174  
Despite its significance, the Pinochet decision is distinguishable from Al 
Bashir in two significant ways. Firstly, the Pinochet decision dealt with a for-
mer head of state and made a clear distinction between immunity for a former 
head of state and a sitting head of state.175 A typical account of this assertion 
is the holding by five of the six Law Lords that a sitting head of state will 
169 Gilbert Sison, supra note 128 at 1584.  
170 Regina v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1334 
(Lord Nicholls), 1338 (Lord Steyn), 1339 
(Lord Hoffman), 1998. 
171 Id. 
172 Id at 1334; See also the See Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, G.A. res. 39/46, [annex, 39 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. 
A/39/51 (1984)], entered into force June 
26, 1987 ; 6/34/L.23 (1979)). Convention 
Against the Taking of Hostages, 18 
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continue to enjoy absolute immunity under international law regardless of the 
gravity of the crimes he committed.176 Secondly, while the Pinochet decision 
pertains to extradition decision to another state for prosecution, Al Bashir’s 
prosecution is before an international tribunal, the ICC, pursuant to jurisdic-
tion created by UNSC. Therefore, despite its importance in analyzing sub-
stantive issues relating to head of state immunity, the Pinochet decision does 
not provide an authoritative reference to the case. 
In general, although both substantive and procedural immunity is avail-
able for a sitting head of state, general international law seems to be moving 
to the direction that abrogates immunity for violations of higher norms of in-
ternational law such as genocide.177 In the words of Arthur Watts; “It can no 
longer be doubted that as a matter of general customary international law a 
Head of State will personally be liable to be called to account if there is suffi-
cient evidence that he authorized or perpetrated such serious international 
crimes.”178 However, state practice is grossly inconsistent and the Head-of-
State immunity seems to stand at a bizarre cross-current of history. Neverthe-
less, the unique circumstances created under the Rome Statute expressly ab-
rogating all forms of official immunity places Al Bashir’s case in a unique 
situation.  
 
4.1- Al Bashir’s Case in the Light of “Case Concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000”  
In the Congo v. Belgium, the International Court examined whether an in-
cumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdoulaye Yerodia, can be tried be-
fore Belgian Courts for offenses of “crimes against humanity and war 
crimes” or protected by immunity from criminal jurisdiction abroad.179 In 
assessing the extent of immunity enjoyed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
the Court adopted a function-based-approach and equated the functions of 
Foreign Minister with that of the Head of State.180 In its judgment, the Court 
enunciated its vision of the state of the law relating to the Head of State im-
munity and proclaimed that:  
176 Id. 
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[a] Minister for Foreign Affairs, responsible for the conduct of his or 
her State’s relations with all other States, occupies a position such 
that, like the Head of State or the Head of Government, he or she is 
recognized under international law as representative of the State 
solely by virtue of his or her office.181 
Ruling in favor of the DRC, the Court proclaimed that an incumbent Minister 
for Foreign Affairs “enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and in-
violability” “throughout the duration of his or her office”.182 However, the 
Court has delineated four exceptions under which the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs can be denied “immunity from criminal jurisdictions and inviolabil-
ity”. In part, the judgment reads: “[a]n incumbent or former Minister for For-
eign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings before certain interna-
tional criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction. Examples include . . . the 
International Criminal Court created by the 1998 Rome Convention.”183 
Thus, the absolute personal immunity enjoyed by the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and head of states does not exonerate the Minister or the President 
from the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, in the light of Congo v. Belgium, Al-
Bashir’s official capacity does not exclude his criminal responsibility, nor 
does it accord immunity from standing trial before the ICC. 
 
4.2- Al Bashir’s Head-of-State-Immunity in the Light of the 
Rome Statute 
The Rome Statute unambiguously states that “official capacity as a Head of 
State or Government, a member of a Government or Parliament, an elected 
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, consti-
tute a ground for reduction of sentence”.184    
Even though the immunity of a sitting head of state stands at a strange 
cross-road, the express reference of the ICJ to the Rome Statute as an excep-
tion to its assessment of the Congo v Belgium case, renders any plea of im-
munity from the Court’s jurisdiction legally implausible. Article 27 of the 
Rome Statute is similar with Article 7(2) of the Statute of the ICTY. In 
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, the ICTY declared Article 7(2) as a codifi-
cation of customary international law.185 Even if the state of the law under 
customary international law is a lex lata, the Rome Statute seems to prevail 
over all other contradictory laws as the lex speciali for the “Darfur Situation”. 
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Therefore, the head of state immunity does not exonerate Al Bashir from the 
competence of the ICC. The Pre-Trial Chamber reiterated this argument in its 
decision for arrest warrant against Al-Bashir.186 
 
Conclusions 
There are difficulties in striking a balance between the backward-looking as-
pects of justice and ensuring effective accountability mechanisms,  and the 
forward looking concerns towards the pursuance and maintenance of  peace. 
The most vexing problem in prosecutorial justice is the question of whether 
traditional prosecutions effectively address contemporary conception of ac-
countability that embraces truth, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition.  
The question of accountability for gross violations of human rights is no 
longer a mere question of investigating and punishing the perpetrator. Al-
though punishment forms the centerpiece of accountability, equally compel-
ling is the response to intuitive human desire to discover the truth and the de-
tail of how and why, by whom and when the victims of human rights have 
suffered the atrocities. The incumbent duty of the state to provide a fair and 
just compensation for victims of human rights and its duty to guarantee that 
those atrocities will never happen again is equally compelling and at the heart 
of the obligation of states. As great as these understandings of accountability 
might appear, international justice does not have the sophistication and insti-
tutional capability to achieve all of these objectives without compromising 
the other.  
Firstly, habeas corpus rights and procedural guarantees such as the stan-
dard of proof and guilt, the presumption of innocence and rules on the admis-
sibility of evidence makes obtaining a guilty verdict against powerful perpe-
trators very difficult, if not impossible. This is even more precarious when 
the accused is a civilian President of the nation or former high ranking offi-
cials capable of mobilizing the state apparatus to suppress evidence.  
Secondly, since punishing perpetrators is only one imperative of justice, 
the interest of peace, and the search for truth will not be possible without a 
certain level of cooperation forthcoming both from the victims and the perpe-
trators and these calls for some sort of compromise. When allegations of the 
victims are corroborated by the perpetrator; it provides a perfect basis for di-
vided societies to come to terms with their brutal past. If the accused is not 
willing to disclose the truth; victims, either primary or secondary, the larger 
society who are indirect victims and subsequent regimes will be all left to 
guess the truth, which is essential for memory and healing.  
186 The International Criminal Court, supra note 121 at Paras-43 and 44.  
 
 
104 MIZAN LAW REVIEW     Vol. 3 No.1,  March 2009 
Thirdly, there are stronger voices against the arrest warrant issued against 
Al Bashir arguing that the move will derail the effort for peace. It should be 
emphasized, however, that peace and justice are mutually reinforcing impera-
tives and not mutually exclusive phenomena. The principle of the head of 
state immunity does not exonerate President Al Bashir from ICC jurisdiction. 
The only way peace could be given a chance is through deferral under Article 
16 of the Rome Statute. However, the deferral of prosecution in the interest 
of peace should anticipate a lasting peace. Even if the indictment is deferred 
in the interest of peace, it should not mean total impunity and responsible in-
dividuals should be held to account when circumstances so permit. The pre-
sent arrest warrant against Al Bashir has nothing to do with the President’s 
guilt or otherwise. It simply means that the Prosecution has established a 
prima-facie case so that the President has a case to answer before the Court. 
In Darfur, alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity have been per-
petrated. When the violation of norms of international law relates to jus co-
gens principles, establishing accountability is never a matter solely within the 
internal affairs of the state. Nevertheless, the Sudan has remained adamant 
about the transfer of Omar Al Bashir, Ahmed Harun and Ali Kushayb to the 
ICC invoking the principle of complementarity and dismissing the Court as 
political. Article 17 of the Rome Statute entitles a state to investigate and 
prosecute the perpetrators only when it is found willing and able to genuinely 
investigate and prosecute the atrocities. The Sudanese SCCED started inves-
tigation of cases that related to Ali Kushayb but not Ahmed Harun and Omar 
Al Bashir. However, while Ali Kushayb has been charged before the ICC for 
acts that constitutes war crimes and crimes against humanity, the SCCED has 
tried him for minor offenses that are of a marginal importance compared to 
the issues before the Court. In addition, the investigation is not related to the 
conduct which is the object of investigation before the Court. These two re-
quirements are cumulative. Therefore, invoking the principle of complemen-
tarity stipulated under Article 17 of the ICC simply flies in the face of the 
Rome Statute. 
Norms of international justice clearly require the GoS to investigate, 
prosecute and duly punish those responsible for the atrocities or transfer them 
to the ICC or states willing and able to do so. Since the ICC is going to un-
dertake only a handful of exemplary prosecutions, the Sudan should prose-
cute the “small fry” before its own Special Courts consistently with its inter-
national obligations. On the other hand, the international community must 
reckon with the grim realities of millions of Darfuris languishing in unbear-
able life situations and place their aspirations before political-point-scoring 
and defer the indictment, if and when the GoS and the rebel groups provide 
sufficient guarantees to make painful concessions for a lasting peace.             
  
